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Non-Trade Values in WTO Appellate Body Jurisprudence 
 
Henrik Andersen 
 
 
Abstract 
The article suggests that the constitutional scope of the WTO leaves a wide space for the Appellate 
Body to protect non-trade values. That has to some extent materialized in Appellate Body practice; 
human health and environment are attaining general protection across the WTO treaties. They are 
recognised as vital and important values by the Appellate Body and they are not just protected as 
exceptional policy objectives to the trade argument; they are part of the trade argument. It is, 
however, still unsettled how other vital values, like those which can fall under peremptory norms, 
can be protected by the Appellate Body and whether its current approach provides the necessary 
tools for their protection.       
 
I. Introduction 
The Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) often takes a central role in 
deciding between trade and non-trade values. Trade values encompass ideas of economic welfare 
and efficiency where the market serves as means to the ends. The market might support non-trade 
values like protection of the environment, animal rights, religious ethics, social rights, labour rights, 
human health etc. For example, organic products can be allocated through the market and without 
trade obstacles reach new territories to the benefit of inter alia consumers, human health, and the 
environment.1 Challenges occur when trade and non-trade values collide; when certain types of 
products are unwanted on a market because of their incompatibilities with non-trade values. 
According to the AB, the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO 
Agreement), as a whole, reflects ‘the balance struck by WTO Members between trade and non-
trade-related concerns.’2 That balance is guided by the language of the respective WTO treaties. 
According to the AB, the non-trade values must be covered by one of the non-trade policy 
                                                 
 Lecturer at Lancashire Law School and Visiting Lecturer at Copenhagen Business School, Law Department. For 
comments please contact henriklaw@yahoo.com.  
1 In this article, ‘value’ is used in a broad sense to denote the ‘principles or moral standards held by a person or social 
group; the generally accepted or personally held judgement of what is valuable and important in life.’ cf. "value, n." 
OED Online. Oxford University Press, June 2014. Web. 21 June 2014. This definition will work for the purpose of this 
article. The AB itself distinguishes between ‘trade’ and ‘non-trade’ values without further clarification of the concepts. 
It is not the aim to engage into a philosophical or sociological discussion about the concept of ‘value’. However, it is 
important to note that for this article, the concept of ‘non-trade value’ does not imply that it is completely detached from 
trade but that the fundamental elements of the value have no connection with trade. For example, even though fair trade 
products can be sold on the market based on consumer choices, the fundamental value behind the fair trade concept is 
poverty reduction and sustainable development. See for example the preamble of the Constitution of Fairtrade Labelling 
Organizations International e.V, adopted on: 25 May 2007, amended on 14 November 2013.  
2 WTO Appellate Body Report, China — Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials (China – Raw 
Materials), joined cases WT/DS394, 395, and 398/AB/R, adopted 22 February 2012, para. 306. 
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objectives in the WTO treaties, like Art. XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
(GATT 1994), in order to be accepted.  
 
This article discusses the AB approach to non-trade values. The article claims that the AB has 
developed different routes to protect non-trade values either through explicit exceptions in the WTO 
treaties, through economic arguments in the national treatment assessment, and through economic 
arguments in subsidy determinations. The AB has in particular protected human health, which is 
considered to be a vital value, and the environment, which is an important value. Questions still 
remain how vital values, like anti-slavery, are protected in the WTO system. The article commences 
(II) by providing an overview of the market-oriented basis of the WTO and the constitutional limits 
of the AB. Next, (III) the article discusses overlaps between the WTO and other regimes where non-
trade values have a stronger footing. Section (IV) concerns how the AB protects non-trade values 
through explicit exceptions in WTO law with focus on GATT 1994, Art. XX. Section (V) focuses 
on situations where the AB has accepted non-trade values without explicit exceptions in the WTO 
treaties. Finally, (VI) the article considers some implications of the AB approach. 
II. The Market-Oriented Basis and Constitutional Limits     
After World War II, new institutional arrangements were designed to replace the politically and 
institutionally fragile League of Nations and provide everlasting peace. Since World War I and II 
had been fuelled by economic nationalism and protectionism, the opening of the international 
markets for trade through the International Trade Organization (ITO) was intended to be a tool to 
reach global peace and economic welfare.3 In market economy theory,4 the market is considered the 
best instrument to achieve an efficient allocation of resources given full information, profit 
maximization, and rational agents,5 and where a reduction of tariffs and elimination of trade barriers 
                                                 
3 John H. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO, and Changing Fundamentals of International Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) 85. 
4 There are different types of market economy perspectives on how and when the public should gain ownership over 
resources as well as when to interfere in the market. For example China works with a ‘socialist market economy’ with 
multiple state-owned companies, cf. Art. 5 - 11 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China whereas the EU 
works with a competitive social market economy with a high level of social protection, cf. Art. 3(3) of the EU Treaty.  
5 ‘Efficiency’ is in itself a contested concept. Pareto efficiency provides that the efficient allocation of resources is a 
state where no further allocation can take place without making minimum one person worse off. Another efficiency 
approach is Kaldor/Hicks which allows for a state where one or more persons are made worse of due to the change in 
the allocation of resources provided that the gain from this re-allocation is higher than the losses for those persons who 
are made worse off. Put differently; that the gain of the winners of the re-allocation of the resources is high enough to 
compensate the losses of the losers. See Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Justice, (Cambridge, Massachusetts and 
London, England: Harvard University Press, 1983) 88-115.  
Neoclassical theory works with assumptions of self-interest, rationality and full information of the agents in the market. 
Property rights are taken for granted. However, the neoclassical approach does not answer questions about law, 
organizations etc. See instead New Institutional Economics’ (NIE) focus on institutions, like law and organizations, and 
on the costs of the market; i.e. transaction costs. See for example R. H. Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’, 4 (16) 
Economica 386 (November 1937). NIE works with bounded rationality and transaction costs, like costs of information 
and costs of defining property rights. See also Eirik G. Furubotn and Rudolf Richter, Institutions and Economic Theory 
– The Contribution of the New Institutional Economics, 2nd ed. (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 2010). 
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lead to comparative advantages for the states.6 However, the market does not always ease the path 
to efficiency. Market failures, like externalities or asymmetrical information, reduce the efficient 
outcome. An externality is a by-product of production and can be positive, i.e. providing benefits 
for others than the agent producing the externality, and/or negative, i.e. imposing costs on others 
than the agent causing the negative externality.7 Governments should interfere into the market in 
order to eliminate those deficiencies and indirectly protect other values if the social costs of their 
reduction or elimination outweigh the private gain. For example pollution of water has high social 
costs and should be regulated accordingly.8 
 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947 was designed to be a temporary 
arrangement until the realization of the ITO. Since the ITO never materialized, GATT became the 
major international trade body administrating international trade rules for nearly 50 years. The aims 
of GATT 1947 were to raise the standard of living, ensuring full employment and a large and 
steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, developing the full use of the world 
resources, and expanding the production and exchange of goods. In order to open international 
markets, GATT 1947 contained 5 basic trade principles; the Most-Favoured-Nation principle 
requiring GATT members not to discriminate between the trading partners; the National Treatment 
principle where GATT Members must not discriminate between domestic and foreign products 
once the foreign products have crossed the custom barrier; principles of market access where tariffs 
are reduced and quantitative restrictions eliminated; principles of fair competition where dumped 
prices are condemned and some subsidies prohibited; transparency where GATT Members must 
publish trade rules and administer them in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner and provide 
judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals to review administrative trade practices. As the market 
ideal could be at odds with national non-trade values like social policies, cultural underpinnings, 
public morality etc., GATT 1947 provided exceptions where the GATT Members could pursue 
national non-trade policies to the detriment of the market ideal.9 
 
The line between trade and non-trade values gave rise to disputes between the GATT members. To 
ensure third party dispute resolution, a panel of experts would be established and provide 
recommendations concerning the interpretation of GATT 1947. The recommendation would only 
attain a binding effect if consensus was reached by all the GATT Members. However, panels 
developed a judicialized approach and GATT became stretched between traditional 
intergovernmentalism and the evolving rule-oriented legal discourse.10 As GATT was insufficient to 
                                                 
6 See about comparative advantages; Alan J. Sykes, ‘Comparative Advantage and the Normative Economics of 
International Trade Policy’, 1 (1) Journal of International Economic Law 49 (1998). 
7 See also R. H. Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Costs’, 3 The Journal of Law and Economics 1 (October 1960), where 
he suggests that in a world with no transactions costs, all externalities will be internalized.  
8 There are also debates about subsidies whether they are economically sound or just a barrier to trade. See for example 
Simon Lester, ‘The Problems of Subsidies as a Means of Protectionism: Lessons from the WTO EC – Aircraft Case’, 12 
(2) Melbourne Journal of International Law 1 (2011) and Alan J. Sykes, ‘Comparative Advantage and the Normative 
Economics of International Trade Policy’, 1 (1) Journal of International Economic Law 49 (1998) at 80-81. 
9 For example, GATT 1947 (now 1994), Art. XX contains exceptions. 
10 See for an overview; John H. Jackson, ‘The Legal Meaning of a GATT Dispute Settlement Report’, in John H. 
Jackson, The Jurisprudence of GATT & the WTO, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 118-132  
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respond to the steady increase in cross-border transactions and growing demand of legal certainty, 
the WTO was negotiated to be the solution. The multilateral nature of GATT and its market-
oriented legacy continued in the WTO but it had a wider scope of aims than GATT, including 
sustainable development and protection and preservation of the environment. The WTO also 
strengthened the dispute settlement system by creating the DSB and the AB and by abandoning the 
veto right.  
 
The institutional changes have led to debates about the possible constitutionalisation of the WTO.11 
In contrast to a traditional, intergovernmental approach, seeing the WTO through constitutional 
lenses leaves room for the AB to include in its methodology both a higher level of abstraction, 
where competing and overlapping values can be weighed and balanced in light of constitutional 
principles like rule of law and proportionality, and a temporal flexibility where concepts of law, 
rights and obligations can be understood in light of contemporary understandings. A constitutional 
approach raises both conceptual and normative questions. First, scholars debate whether the WTO 
qualifies as a constitutional system which ultimately depends on the definition of ‘constitution’ and 
its applicability to functional communities.12 For example, some scholars provide abstract 
definitions of ‘constitutions’ and ‘constitutionalization’ which encompass functional communities.13 
Other scholars find that the WTO lacks fundamental constitutional traits like the ability to make 
secondary law and it has democratic deficits.14 A third approach is forwarded by Walker where the 
question of constitutionalisation is a matter of degree. The WTO can be conceived in constitutional 
terms even if some of the constitutional factors are underdeveloped.15 Secondly, a constitutional 
narrative on meta-level, i.e. beyond the scope of the nation-state, calls into question the traditional 
Westphalian assumptions of international law as a system of sovereign states with exclusive 
authority for rule creation, interpretation, and enforcement and where the reach of the constitution is 
                                                 
11 See for example Neil Walker, ‘The EU and the WTO: Constitutionalism in a New Key’, in De Búrca and Scott (eds), 
The EU and the WTO: Legal and Constitutional Issues, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001), 31-57; Jeffrey L. Dunoff, 
‘Constitutional Conceits: The WTO’s ‘Constitution’ and the Discipline of International Law’, 17 (3) The European 
Journal of International Law, 647 (2006); Joel P. Trachtman, ‘The Constitutions of the WTO’, 17 (3) The European 
Journal of International Law, 623 (2006); See for a number of contributors and discussions in Christian Joerges and 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds.), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and International Economic Law, 2nd 
ed., (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011). 
12 Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International Regimes’, 16 (2) Indiana Journal of Global 
Legal Studies, 621 (2009). See also Jessica Lawrence, ‘Contesting constitutionalism: Constitutional discourse at the 
WTO’, 2:1 Global Constitutionalism, 63 (2013) where the question of ‘constitutionalization’ of the WTO is a discursive 
contest. 
13 For example, Alec Stone Sweet has defined constitution as ‘a body of meta-norms, those higher-order legal rules and 
principles that specify how all other lower-order legal norms are to be produced, applied, enforced, and interpreted,’ 
ibid at 626. See for a more normative definition Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘International Economic Law, 'Public 
Reason', and Multilevel Governance of Interdependent Public Goods’, 14 (1) Journal of International Economic Law, 
23 (2011) at 53. According to Petersmann, a constitution – even the functionally limited community constitutions, like 
the WTO – serves to protect rule of law and justice.  
14 See for example Peter Holmes, ’The WTO and the EU: Some Constitutional Comparisons’ in De Búrca and Scott 
(eds), The EU and the WTO: Legal and Constitutional Issues, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001), 59-80 
15 See for example Neil Walker’s 7 factors of constitutionalism; constitutional mature discourse, authority, jurisdiction, 
interpretative autonomy, institutional capacity, citizenship, and representation. Those factors can be applied on non-
state polities and they are not all-or-nothing terms but must rather be understood with nuance and gradation. Neil 
Walker, above n 11, 31-57.   
5 
 
limited by geographical territories. International law is here based on consent and practice between 
states. By adopting a constitutional narrative, the traditional international system is re-mapped. It 
implies other actors than the states in international rule creation, interpretation and enforcement, 
and it elevates certain principles of law to a supreme level in international matters. This writer takes 
the position that international organizations, like the WTO, have constitutional traits,16 where the 
WTO Agreement is the constitutional basis for the AB. It provides the constitutional equilibrium 
between the various WTO organs and the WTO Members, and it prevails in case of conflict with all 
other multilateral treaties which are annexed to the WTO Agreement.17 Even though the WTO does 
not have a high level of constitutional maturity and with only limited citizen representation, it has 
de facto authority to define its jurisdictional and interpretative space.18 The WTO Members are 
influential in the interpretation of the WTO treaties through their representation in the Ministerial 
Conference and the General Council which have exclusive authority to adopt final interpretations of 
the WTO Agreement and all the multilateral treaties by three-fourth majority.19 However, that tool 
is rarely applied.20 Instead panels and AB are often used to provide interpretations of the WTO 
treaties and to strike the balance between trade and non-trade values. The mandate of panels and the 
AB follows from the WTO Agreement and is clarified in the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU). They must preserve the rights and obligations of the WTO Members under the various 
WTO agreements; they must clarify the provisions of those agreements in accordance with 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law; and they cannot add to or diminish the 
rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.21 Within those constraints the AB has 
made a clear mark in defining both its constitutional and interpretative space. It has developed its 
own legal discourse; it develops legal argumentations beyond the arguments of the disputing 
parties;22 it examines national law’s compliance with WTO law;23  and even though AB case-law 
formally does not have the character of ‘final interpretations’, which would be crossing the line into 
Ministerial Conference and General Council territory, the decisions serve de facto as a source of 
law-like tool and are applied in the legal argumentation by the AB, the panels and the WTO 
                                                 
16 Ibid. For example, the UN has constitutional traits like the authority of the UN Security Council, the ILO has also 
constitutional traits like, for example, the representation of employees and employers in the rule creation.   
17 WTO Agreement, Art. XVI (3). 
18 Neil Walker, above n 11. 
19 WTO Agreement, Art. IX. 
20 It has been used to protect non-trade values like the 2001 Doha Declaration where human health and access to 
medicine for all justified limitations on intellectual property rights in developing and least-developed countries. See 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Doha 9-14 November 
2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 of 20 November 2001. 
21 DSU, Art. 3.2. 
22See WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones) (EC – Hormones), WT/DS26 and 48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, para 156; WTO Appellate Body 
Report, United States — Import Measures on Certain Products from the European Communities (US – Certain EC 
Products), WT/DS165/AB/R, adopted 10 January 2001, para 123, and WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada — 
Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector (Canada – Renewable Energy) WT/DS412/AB/R 
and Canada — Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program (Canada – Feed-In Tariff Program), 
WT/DS426/AB/R, adopted 24 May 2013, paras 5.214-5.215. 
23 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon 
Steel Flat Products from Japan (US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review), WT/DS244/AB/R, adopted 9 January 
2004, para. 82. 
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Members.24 In the view of the AB, ‘absent cogent reasons, an adjudicatory body will resolve the 
same legal question in the same way in a subsequent case.’25 That argument is a corner-stone of a 
constitutional society based on rule of law and its implied principle of legal certainty. Stone Sweet 
has even suggested that the AB acts as a constitutional court.26 However, the role of the AB is not 
unproblematic; it must decide in a grey-zone of overlaps between WTO law and law of other 
international regimes.  
III. Overlaps between the WTO and Other Regimes 
Non-trade values have stronger roots in other international organizations than the WTO. For 
example, the United Nations (UN) aims at saving future generations from war, reaffirming faith in 
human rights and equal rights between men and women and big and small nations, providing 
frameworks upon which justice and freedom can be protected, and promoting social progress and 
better standards of life in larger freedom; the World Health Organization (WHO) aims at promoting 
and protecting health of all peoples; the International Labour Organization (ILO) promotes and 
protects social justice for workers and protects children. Protection of such aims and values may not 
be compatible with the WTO unless they have explicit basis under one of the exceptions. The 
multilevel and overlapping nature of the functional communities generates normative challenges for 
the AB. A rejection of other international treaties would put the WTO Members at odds with their 
other international commitments. Yet, the map of international organizations shows an uneven 
landscape of constitutional, political and legal maturity. Their legal or interpretative autonomy are 
at different levels; some sectors have a more intergovernmental character than others; and their 
legal and constitutional cultures are different. This seeming disorder of international organizations 
with different aims, values and legal and constitutional maturity has led to theoretical and normative 
debates about norm hierarchy and relations between the various regimes. Legal pluralists suggest a 
heterarchy between those regimes with no overall constitutional or legal solution to the disorder or 
conflicts between overlapping orders. Rather it seeks political solutions in this fragmented world.27 
Constitutional pluralists, on the other hand, search for meta-constitutional principles which are 
                                                 
24 Occasionally, the EU Courts also refer to AB reports; see for example Case C‑414/11, Daiichi Sankyo and Sanofi-
Aventis Deutschland (2013) ECR I‑0000, para. 80. However, there are some reservations as the Court has stated that it 
alone has jurisdiction to determine whether an EU act is unlawful, see for example Case C‑533/10, CIVAD (2012) ECR 
I‑0000, para. 40, and WTO treaties do not have direct effect, see for example Joined Cases C‑120/06 P and C‑121/06 
P, FIAMM and Others v Council and Commission (2008) ECR I‑6513, paras. 127-133. 
25 See WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico (US 
– Stainless Steel (Mexico)), WT/DS344/AB/R, adopted 20 May 2008, para. 160. See also the comment by the AB in 
WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations” (US – FSC), 
WT/DS108/AB/R, adopted 20 March 2000, footnote 127, where it clearly distinguishes between the interpretations 
provided by a Ministerial Conference and General Council under Art. IX.2 of the WTO Agreement and an 
interpretation provided by the AB. 
26 Alec Stone Sweet, above n 12, at 642. 
27 See for example Nico Krisch, ‘The Case for Pluralism in Postnational Law’, in Gráinne De Búrca & J.H.H. Weiler 
(eds.), The Worlds of European Constitutionalism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 203-261; Martti 
Koskenniemi and Päivi Leino, ‘Fragmentation of International Law? – Postmodern Anxieties’, 15 (3) Leiden Journal of 
International Law 553 (2002).  
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common ground for the competing constitutional regimes.28 Constitutional pluralism does not 
suggest a hierarchical governance structure as the institutions must defer to the constitutional 
boundaries of the overlapping constitutions. Instead meta-constitutional principles develop through 
coordinated efforts by international institutions like international courts.29  
 
In practice, the constitutional borders and the interrelationship between the WTO and other 
international organizations are not easily drawn. The UN Charter provides that it prevails in case of 
conflict with other treaties.30 It will not be in conflict with WTO law if a WTO Member pursues 
obligations under the UN Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.31 For 
example, if the UN Security Council passes a resolution imposing economic sanctions towards a 
state, which violates international peace or security, WTO Members can comply with the resolution 
without violating WTO law.32 Yet it remains unclear whether the UN Charter will prevail beyond 
the maintenance of international peace and security obligation.33 For example, even though the 
preamble of the UN Charter refers to human rights, and similar support can be found in the 
preamble of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which serves as the 
interpretative basis for the AB, the question is whether human rights can be transplanted into the 
                                                 
28 The conceptualization of constitutional pluralism and its normative dimension lacks clarity. See for example Matej 
Avbelj and Jan Komárek, ‘Four Visions of Constitutional Pluralism’, 4 (3) European Constitutional Law Review 524 
(2008). See also Neil Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’, 65 The Modern Law Review 317 (2002); and 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Economic Law in the 21st Century – Constitutional Pluralism and Multilevel 
Governance of Interdependent Public Goods, (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing 2012). Alec Stone Sweet 
has suggested two approaches of ‘constitutional pluralism’; one sees the multilevel constitutions as pluralist and 
disordered but through the interaction of the various constitutional orders, some overall system will develop. The other 
type is a ‘higher law’ approach where the outset is some higher meta-norms, like human rights and rule of law, which 
guide the pluralistic constitutional orders when they interfere. See Alec Stone Sweet, above n 12 at 632. 
29 See for example the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) referring to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
like the recent case, Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (merits and just satisfaction), no. 60642/08, § 40, ECHR 2012. But also its inclusion of other 
treaties, like The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). In Anheuser-Busch Inc. 
v. Portugal (merits and just satisfaction) [GC], no. 73049/01, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2007-I, which 
concerned Art. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, TRIPS served as relevant international law although 
the Grand Chamber did not refer to TRIPS. Laurence R. Helfer has suggested that the language of the Grand Chamber 
in the specific case resemblances the language of TRIPS and that TRIPS may serve as inspiration for the ECHR; 
Laurence R. Helfer, ‘The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual Property and the European Court of Human Rights’, 49 
(1) Harvard International Law Journal 1 (2008), at 40-42. See also reference to the WTO and US – Shrimps in the  joint 
dissenting opinion of judges David Thór Björgvinsson, Vučinić and Nussberger in Herrmann v. Germany (merits and 
just satisfaction) [GC], no. 9300/07, ECHR 2012. 
30 Art. UN Charter, Art. 103. 
31 GATT 1994, Art. XXI (c), GATS, Art. XIV bis.1 (c), and TRIPS, Art. 73 (c).  
32 Mostly the sanctions by the Security Council concerns financial assets or weapon embargos although on occasion an 
export prohibition has been applied on luxury goods, see for example UN Security Council Resolution 1874, 
S/RES/1874 (2009), in combination with Security Council Resolution 1718, S/RES/1718 (2006) which concerned a 
non-WTO Member, North Korea.  
33 See for example the discussion about Westphalian versus Eastphalian approaches to concepts of ‘universal law’, 
Andrew Coleman and Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, ‘”Westphalian” Meets “Eastphalian” Sovereignty: China in a 
Globalized World’, 3 (2) Asian Journal of International Law 237 (2013). In practice, the European Court of Justice has 
shown dualist traits towards Security Council Resolutions concerning peace and security if they do not conform to 
fundamental rights. See Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, Joined Cases 
C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, (2008) ECR I-6351, paras. 282-285. See for a discussion and critique of the EU Court; 
Gráinne de Búrca ‘The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order After Kadi’, 51 (1) Harvard 
International Law Journal 1 (Winter 2010). 
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WTO system and whether they have a special status in WTO law. The WTO treaties do not 
explicitly refer to human rights although it is debated whether human rights can fall under public 
morals exceptions.34 A human rights dimension in the WTO also faces other challenges. Human 
rights do not have a clear definition and they are spread across various treaties, constitutions, and 
bill of rights on international, regional, and national levels where they are subject to cultural, 
political, ethical, economic, and social differences.35 Most international treaties are not ratified by 
all states due to those differences.36 In addition, human rights protect individuals against states; they 
do not create rights for states. Moreover, WTO law has its Members as subjects, and only members 
have locus standi in the DSB, i.e. individuals cannot make human rights claims before panels and 
AB.37 Nevertheless, it may be asked whether a WTO Member can include human rights 
considerations as legitimate reasons for not complying with the basic trade principles against 
another state if that particular state violates human rights standards. Notwithstanding the 
disagreements on the scope and definitions of ‘human rights’, ‘fundamental rights’, and 
‘peremptory norms,’ most states recognize the ‘inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world’ through their ratifications of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and/or the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and 
they are bound by those human rights which qualify as peremptory norms.38 Accordingly, some 
human rights are recognized on meta-level and should not be ignored by the AB even though their 
concrete content are subject to multidimensional understandings.39 Furthermore, the overlaps 
between WTO law and human rights law might to some extent be solved through WTO law itself. 
At the 1996 WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore, the Ministerial Conference adopted a 
Declaration where it renewed its commitment to ‘the observance of internationally recognized core 
labour standards’ where the ILO is the ‘competent body to set and deal with these standards’.40 The 
                                                 
34 See more below in section IV. 
35 See for example the ‘margin of appreciation’ developed by the ECHR where inter alia cultural, historical, ethical 
differences between the European States are accepted. For example, S.A.S. v. France (merits and just satisfaction) [GC], 
no. 43835/11, ECHR 2014, concerned a French ban on the wearing of full-face veils in public places in France. It was 
claimed that the ban violated the right to freedom of religion of the European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 9. 
According to the ECHR, it was a choice of ‘society’ where France protected the principle of interaction between 
individuals where full-face veils could be a limitation on social communication. The ECHR recognised the lack of 
European consensus among the States concerning such a ban and referred to Leyla Şahin v. Turkey (merits and just 
satisfaction [GC], no. 44774/98, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2005-XI, where it had stated that such rules would 
differ from country to country based on national traditions. Hence France had a wide margin of appreciation and the 
ECHR found that France had not violated the Convention. See in particular paras. 132-159. 
36 Theodore Meron, ‘On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights’, 80 (1) The American Journal of International Law 
1 (January, 1986). See also Marie-Bénédicte Dembour, ‘What Are Human Rights? Four Schools of Thought’, 32 
Human Rights Quarterly 1 (2010). 
37 Human rights views could be expressed by NGOs who may submit amicus curae briefs. 
38 See Art. 53 of the VCLT and the position taken by the International Law Commission in its Report of the 
International Law Commission on the Work of Its 34th Session, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, (1982), 
vol. II, Part Two, p. 56.   
39 Theodore Meron, above n 36. 
40 SINGAPORE WTO MINISTERIAL 1996: MINISTERIAL DECLARATION. WT/MIN(96)/DEC, 18 December 
1996. 
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ILO’s core principles are enshrined in 8 fundamental ILO conventions.41 One of them is the Worst 
Forms of Child Labour Convention which provides that child slavery is prohibited and the ILO 
Members must sanction conduct which is incompatible with the convention.42 Thus an importing 
state may penalize a company if its imported products are produced in violation of the convention 
without violating WTO law.43 Besides the Singapore Ministerial Declaration, there may be support 
in GATT 1994, Art. XX (a) for such position, see more in IV.  
 
As the constitutional borders between the WTO and other regimes, like the UN and the ILO, are 
rather aqueous instead of solid rock, and with the requirement in DSU, Art. 3.2 to clarify the WTO 
treaties in accordance with the customary rules of interpretation of public international law, it can 
be argued that the AB has sufficient interpretative space to include other international treaties, like 
the ICCPR, the ICESCR, ILO Conventions and numerous environmental treaties, when they 
overlap with WTO law. The AB itself refers to Art. 31 and Art. 32 of the VCLT as customary rules 
of interpretation of public international law. Art. 31(1) provides that a treaty must be interpreted in 
good faith ‘in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to their terms in their context and 
in light of its object and purpose.’ Art. 31(3)(c) requires that ‘[t]here shall be taken into account, 
together with the context: (…)  Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties.’44 Thus the normative environment must be taken into account when a treaty 
provision is interpreted.45 The AB has stated that interpretation after Art. 31 of the VCLT is a 
‘holistic exercise’ and that WTO treaties are ‘not to be read in clinical isolation from public 
international law.’46 According to the AB this wider context consists of ‘any relevant rules of 
international law’ corresponding to the catalogue of sources applicable to the International Court of 
justice (ICJ).47 In EC and Certain Member States – Large Civil Aircraft, the AB stated that Art. 
31(3)(c) reflects the principle of systemic integration and requires that any relevant rule of 
international law between the parties must be taken into account. The AB, however, expressed some 
caution about including other international treaties which not all the WTO Members are parties to. 
According to the AB, it must strike a balance between the respective WTO Members’ international 
                                                 
41 See for example Henrik Andersen, ’Core Workers’ Rights as Constitutional Principles in the WTO’, in Fejø, 
Neergaard, Tvarnø and Ølykke (eds), Festskrift Liber Americum et Amicorum in Honour of Ruth Nielsen, (Copenhagen: 
Jurist og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 2013), 31-59 at 41. 
42 See the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, Art. 1. 
43 See for example Shima Baradaran and Stephanie Barclay, ‘Fair Trade and Child Labour’, 43 (1) Columbia Human 
Rights Law Review 1 (2011) at 21-23. 
44 See for more thorough discussions about the VCLT, Art. 31(3)(c) in for example Benn McGrady,  ‘Fragmentation of 
International Law or ''Systemic Integration'' of Treaty Regimes: ECÐBiotech Products and the Proper Interpretation of 
Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’ 42 (4) Journal of World Trade 589 (2008); Campbell 
McLachlan, ’The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(C) of the Vienna Convention’ 54 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 279 (April 2005). 
45 Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International 
Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission at its fifty-eighth session, finalized by Martii 
Koskenniemi, UN Document A/CN.4/L.682, para. 415. See about the obligatory requirement, the International Law 
Commission DRAFT ARTICLES to VCLT para. 9 re Art. 27. 
46 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US – 
Gasoline), WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, p. 17. 
47 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China (US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China)), WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 25 March 
2011, para 304.  
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obligations and ‘a consistent and harmonious approach to the interpretation of WTO law among all 
WTO Members.’48 Thus the VCLT requires that rules of international law which represent non-
trade values must serve as interpretative context if they are relevant to the interpretation of the 
respective WTO provisions. According to the AB, a rule of international law is relevant if it 
‘concerns the subject matter of the provision at issue.’49 For example if some WTO Members have 
specified trade relations between them in a bilateral agreement it can serve as interpretative tool. 
However, the argument can be taken further; if a WTO provision potentially can be at odds with a 
rule of international law, the AB should seek an interpretation of the WTO provision which will 
harmonize with the rule of international law in order to avoid conflict.      
 
A closer look at AB jurisprudence reveals that the AB only rarely looks outside the WTO 
framework. For example, the AB referred to other treaties in EC - Asbestos to establish facts and in 
US - Shrimps as interpretative tools.50 Apart from that, other international treaties only play a 
limited role in AB jurisprudence. For example, the AB has never referred to any human rights 
treaties. It must be mentioned that there has so far only been one case in the WTO which directly 
concerned human rights and which could have shed some light on the role of human rights in the 
WTO. In US – Procurement, the EU and Japan questioned the Massachusetts practice of rejecting 
companies, which were doing business with Myanmar (Burma), from qualifying to submit bids on 
public procurements. One reason for rejecting such companies’ bids was the lack of human rights 
protection in Myanmar (Burma). The EU and Japan claimed that the Massachusetts practice 
violated the Agreement on Government Procurement as the qualification of suppliers was based on 
political rather than economic considerations. Later, the EU and Japan requested the Panel to 
suspend the panel proceedings and the case expired.51 Even though human rights only have been 
mentioned in US – Procurement, it does not mean that there have not been situations with potential 
overlaps between WTO law and human rights. In China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, 
the AB did not take the opportunity to include a human rights dimension in its interpretation of 
WTO law.52 The case concerned China’s import restrictions on publications and audiovisual 
                                                 
48 WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (EC and 
Certain Member States – Large Civil Aircraft), WT/DS316/AB/R, adopted 1 June 2011, para. 845. See the ICJ in Oil 
Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 161, para. 41; ‘The 
application of the relevant rules of international law (…) forms an integral part of the task of interpretation’.  
49 Para. 848. 
50 WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing 
Asbestos (EC – Asbestos), WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, and  WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – 
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (US – Shrimps), WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 
1998. See more in section IV. 
51 See Request for Consultations by the European Communities and Japan, United States – Measure Affecting 
Government Procurement (US – Procurement), WT/DS88/1, GPA/D2/1 of 26 June 1997, and WT/DS95/1, GPA/D3/1 
of 21 July 1997, panel lapsed. The Massachusetts Burma Law was later found to be unconstitutional by the US Supreme 
Court because 1) the President of the US, not Massachusetts, had the authority to control sanctions against Burma, 2) 
the US Congress intended to reduce the level of economic sanctions against Burma, and 3) the President of the US had 
authority to develop a strategy concerning Burma with other States on a multilateral level. See Crosby v. National 
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
52 WTO Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain 
Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products (China – Publications and Audiovisual Products), 
WT/DS363/AB/R, adopted 19 January 2010. 
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products. China limited the right to import reading material, audiovisual home entertainment 
products, sound recordings, and film to state-owned enterprises and prohibited foreign-invested 
enterprises and private companies from importing such products. The restrictions violated the 
national treatment obligations under both GATT 1994, Art. III and GATS, Art. XVII. China 
claimed that the restrictions were justified under GATT 1994, Art. XX to protect public morals as 
there was a general prohibition of publication of violent and obscene material in China.53 Even 
though the restrictions could be justified in order to protect public morals the measures did not pass 
the necessity test.54 The AB referred to previous AB findings where ‘necessary’ must be established 
on basis of the level of contribution the measures make to the protection of ‘public morals’ and that 
it must be based on evidence or data pertaining to the past or present.55 The AB did not discuss 
GATT 1994, Art. XX in light of human rights. Even though public morals may justify the 
restriction of media which can carry violent and obscene expressions, such restrictions can be a 
limitation of freedom of expression.56 If Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT and its preamble are taken into 
consideration, it may be asked whether the policy objectives in GATT 1994, Art. XX and GATS, 
Art. XIV should be interpreted in light of international human rights instruments when there are 
such potential overlaps between WTO law and human rights. After all the preamble of the VCLT 
provides for the observance of human rights and fundamental freedom for all and most of the WTO 
Members are bound by the ICCPR and/or ICESCR. Human rights will be further addressed in 
section IV. However, neither the US nor any of the third parties in China – Publications and 
Audiovisual Products referred to human rights. It is a general observation from disputes in the WTO 
that human rights considerations are not included by the disputing parties, third parties, panels or 
AB.57       
IV. The AB and Explicit Exceptions 
GATT 1994, Art. XX encompasses a list of exceptions to the basic trade principles.58 The AB has 
stated that the list of exceptions is exhaustive.59 Thus Art. XX can only protect those values which 
                                                 
53 See more about ’public morals’ in GATT 1994, Art. XX (a) and GATS, Art. XIV (a) below. In the specific case, 
China did not invoke GATS, Art. XIV (a) to justify the measures which the panel had found to be inconsistent with 
GATS Art. XVI and Art. XVII.  
54 The US did not dispute the argumentant that violent and obscene material can be justified under GATT 1994, Art. 
XX (a).  
55 Paras 251-252. See more below in section IV. 
56 China has not ratified the ICCPR. However, the UN Human Rights Council, which promotes human rights as well as 
makes recommendations to the General Assembly for the further development of human rights, undertakes periodic 
reviews of the UN Member States on a general level, including reviews of their conformity with principles of those 
human rights treaties which are not ratified by the State under review. See for example the recommendation by the 
working group on the periodic universal review of China and the ICCPR, A/HRC/11/25, 5 October 2009, para. 114. See 
also Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, above n 28, at 269-270. 
57 Other international courts also avoid the human rights dimension. See for example The Arctic Sunrise Case, where 
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) left out any discussion on the human rights argument 
forwarded by the Netherlands that Russia violated Art. 9 and Art. 12 of the ICCPR. The ITLOS based its legal 
argumentation on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea; the Arctic Sunrise Case (Kingdom of the Netherlands v. 
Russian Federation) Provisional Measures, Order of 22 November 2013, ITLOS Reports 2013. See in contrast the 
dissenting opinion delivered by Judge Kulyk who includes the human rights dimension, para. 12. 
58 GATT 1994, Art XX has other qualifications than the listed policy objectives. The chapeau of Art. XX requires that 
the measures restricting trade must not be applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
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can be subsumed under at least one of the explicit policy objectives.60 As mentioned above, the AB 
will on rare occasions seek guidance from other sources of law and international organizations in 
order to give meaning to and define the scope of the non-trade policy objectives. For example in EC 
– Asbestos, the AB referred both to the WHO and the International Agency for Research on Cancer 
in support of the view that chrysotile asbestos fibres and chrysotile-cement products pose a risk to 
human health,61 and in US – Shrimp, the AB referred to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea and the Final Act of the Conference to Conclude a Convention on the Conservation 
of Migratory Species of Wild Animals in defining exhaustible natural resources.62 Also in US – 
Shrimp, the AB included a temporal dimension; according to the AB, the term ‘exhaustible natural 
resources’ was ‘actually crafted more than 50 years ago. They must be read by a treaty interpreter in 
the light of contemporary concerns of the community of nations about the protection and 
conservation of the environment.’63 The interpretative approach by the AB is open-ended in the 
sense that the policy objectives are flexible to contemporary ideas and understandings in the context 
of other international organizations.  
 
In contrast to the closed list in GATT 1994, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
provides an open list. It permits WTO Members to apply technical regulations which may concern 
product characteristics or processes and production methods as well as terminology, symbols, 
packaging marking or labelling requirements.64 A technical barrier to trade must pursue ‘legitimate 
                                                                                                                                                                  
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, and they must not be a disguised 
restriction on international trade. Those requirements are very interesting but outside the scope of this article.  
59 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, above n 46, p. 22. See about the TBT Agreement below.  
60 For example, in respect of ‘public morals’, the AB has recognised that ‘public morality’ may vary from state to state 
due to differences in social, cultural, ethical and religious values and that there must be some scope for the WTO 
Members to decide their respective public morals, see WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities – 
Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products (EC – Seal Products), WT/DS400/AB/R and 
WT/DS401/AB/R, adopted 18 June 2014, paras 5.199-5.200, referring to the WTO Panel Report, United States – 
Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (US – Gambling), WT/DS285/R, paras 
6.461-6.465.  Under the public morals category the AB has accepted animal welfare and prohibition against 
publications of violent and obscene material as well as material propagating hatred and discrimination; see Appellate 
Body Report, EC – Seal Products and Appellate Body Report, China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, above n 
52, para 243, referring to the panel report, paras. 7.760-7.763. The category of ‘exhaustible resources’ has been applied 
to protect clean air and sea turtles, see for example Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, above n 46, although it is 
implied in the obiter dicta, and Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimps, above note 50. Protection of human life and 
health has been applied to protect national measures against chrysotile-cement products  and measures against waste 
tyres causing dengue fever and malaria, see for example Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, above n 50, and WTO 
Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (Brazil – Retreaded Tyres), 
WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted 17 December 2007. ‘Secure compliance with laws or regulations’ has been applied to 
protect measures countering tax evasion and smuggling. See for example WTO Appellate Body Report, Dominican 
Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes (Dominican Republic – Import and Sale 
of Cigarettes), WT/DS302/AB/R, adopted 19 May 2005. 
61 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, above n 50, para. 162. See also WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – 
Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes (US – Clove Cigarettes), WT/DS406/AB/R, adopted 
24 April 2012, where the AB referred to the WHO in support of the view that WTO Members may implement public 
health policies and tobacco control and prohibit or restrict certain ingredients in tobacco products, paras. 11 and 235-
236. 
62 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, above n 50, para. 130. 
63 Ibid., para. 129. 
64 TBT Agreement, Annex 1. This is an area where the dichotomy into ‘trade’ and ‘non-trade’ is not that obvious. For 
example, labelling is a means to reduce asymmetrical information between the producer and the consumer. 
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objectives’ which ‘inter alia’ are protection of human, animal or plant life or health, protection of 
the environment, or prevention of deceptive practices.65 According to the AB, the list is not 
exhaustive. If the ‘legitimate objective’ is not listed, it must be an aim or target ‘that is lawful, 
justifiable, or proper.’66 Such lawful, justifiable or proper aim or target may be one of the objectives 
mentioned in one of the other WTO treaties, like GATT 1994, Art. XX.67 The AB does not provide 
further guidance on legitimate objectives outside the texts of the WTO treaties and it may indicate 
that the AB will not read further legitimate objectives into the TBT Agreement than those 
mentioned in the WTO treaties.68  
 
It is unsettled in AB practice how those non-trade values, which are underlying peremptory norms 
and human rights, should be approached. In respect of peremptory norms, one route to take is to 
regard such norms as higher ranking per se due to their peremptory nature. The trade principles 
must conform to the peremptory norms. Thus it is not a matter of derogation from the basic trade 
principles. The interpretation of WTO provisions must in no way lead to a result where peremptory 
norms are violated. Another route to take is to accept such norms under the exceptions in the 
treaties where they must fall under one of the explicit non-trade policy objectives. The problem with 
that approach is that before the exception is applied, there must in the first place have been a 
violation of one of the WTO trade rules. If the violation of the trade rule is a result of a WTO 
Member’s compliance with peremptory norms, there is a conflict between the WTO rule and the 
peremptory norm where the latter should prevail.69 The exceptions might be better suited for such 
human rights which do not qualify as peremptory norms.  
 
It is here worth noting that the AB in its necessity analyses has opened the door to rank non-trade 
values in accordance to their ‘importance’.70 GATT 1994, Art. XX (a), (b), and (d) provide that the 
national measures must be ‘necessary’ in order to protect the particular policy objective.71 In Korea 
– Various Measures on Beef, the AB stated that the necessity analysis ‘involves in every case a 
process of weighing and balancing a series of factors which prominently include the contribution 
made by the compliance measure to the enforcement of the law or regulation at issue, the 
importance of the common interests or values protected by that law or regulation, and the 
                                                 
65 TBT Agreement, Art. 2.2. 
66 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements (US – 
COOL), WT/DS384 and WT/DS386/AB/R, adopted 23 July 2012, para. 370 and WTO Appellate Body Report, United 
States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US – Tuna II 
(Mexico)), WT/DS381/AB/R, adopted 13 June 2012, para. 313. 
67 Ibid. 
68 See also para. 314 in US – Tuna II (Mexico), ibid, which provides that a panel must follow the guidelines provided by 
the AB in para. 313. Thus it would be difficult for a panel to read other legitimate objectives into the TBT Agreement 
without stepping outside those AB guidelines. 
69 See also VCLT Art. 53 which renders the trade rule void if it conflicts with peremptory norms. 
70 See for a thorough exam of the proportionality test applied in the WTO, Mads Andenas and Stefan Zleptnig, 
‘Proportionality: WTO Law: In a Comparative Perspective’, 42 (3) Texas International Law Journal 371 (2007). 
71 GATT 1994, Art. XX provides different qualifications between the respective policy objectives and the national 
measures where ‘necessary’ is one of them. The others are ‘relating to’ in Art. XX (c), (e), and (g), ‘in pursuance of’ in 
Art. XX (h), ‘essential’ in Art. XX (j), ‘for the protection of’ in Art. XX (f), and ‘involving’ in Art. XX (i).  
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accompanying impact of the law or regulation on imports or exports.’72 In Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, 
the AB refined its approach. Referring to US – Gambling, the AB stated that ‘the weighing and 
balancing process inherent in the necessity analysis “begins with an assessment of the 'relative 
importance' of the interests or values furthered by the challenged measure”, and also involves an 
assessment of other factors, which will usually include “the contribution of the measure to the 
realization of the ends pursued by it” and “the restrictive impact of the measure on international 
commerce”.’73 In the particular case, the AB supported the panel finding that protection of human 
health and life against dengue fever and malaria is vital and important in the highest degree and the 
aim of protecting the environment is important.74 Apparently, the level of the necessity standard 
depends on the particular interest or value which the challenged measure seeks to protect. It is 
unclear on what basis the AB makes such ‘importance’ evaluation,75 but the ranking of non-trade 
values raises the question whether vital non-trade values require lower qualification in order to be 
subsumed under the explicit policy objectives than less important values. For example, the 
prohibition against ‘work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is 
likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children’ in the Worst Forms of Child Labour 
Convention, Art. 1 and Art. 3(d) protects vital values of health, safety and morality of children. It 
should be basis for an importing WTO Member to reject products produced in violation of that rule. 
The question is whether GATT 1994, Art. XX (b) can be applied by an importing WTO Member 
towards products from those countries which violate the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention 
or if it is limited to only cover the health of people within own territory. If Art. XX (b) does not 
apply, a prohibition has a legal basis under the ‘public morals’ exception in Art. XX (a). The public 
morals exception has some flexibility as it leaves some room for national differences in social, 
cultural, ethical and religious values.76 This position, however, leads to jurisdictional issues; if a 
WTO Member can impose import bans on products due to their process of production, including the 
conditions for workers, instead of the characteristics of the products, WTO Members may impose 
their own public morality standards on other states. The AB will most likely look for some 
connection between the object being protected and the importing state. In US – Shrimp, the AB 
                                                 
72 WTO Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef (Korea – 
Various Measures on Beef), WT/DS161 and 169/AB/R, adopted 10 January 2001, para. 164. See also Appellate Body 
Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, above n 60, paras. 141-143. 
73 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, above n 60, para. 143, citing WTO Appellate Body Report, United 
States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (US – Gambling), 
WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted 20 April 2005, para. 306, which concerned the interpretation of GATS Art. XIV, which is 
applicable to the interpretation of GATT Art. XX. 
74 Para. 179. Where the AB has ranked policy objectives under the necessary test, it is different with the ‘relating’ test. 
The concept of ‘relating’ is linked to more economic-oriented policy objectives, like the one mentioned above about the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources, where extinction of such resources is an irreversible cost to society with 
no possibility to recover for future production. Hence those policy objectives might by their underlying economic 
values already be regarded as important. ‘Relating’ is interpreted more flexible than ‘necessary’ by the AB, see for 
example Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, above n 72, footnote 104. 
75 See for a critique of this approach Robert Howse and Elisabeth Turk, ‘The WTO Impact on Internal Regulations: A 
Case Study of the Canada – EC Asbestos Dispute’, in Gráinne De Búrca and Johanne Scott (eds), The EU and the WTO 
– Legal and Constitutional Issues, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001), 283-328 at 325-327. 
76 Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, above n 60, paras 5.199-5.200. See also Robert Howse, ‘The World 
Trade Organization and Protection of Workers’ Rights’, 3 The Journal of Small and Emerging Business Law 131 
(1999) 
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found that there was sufficient connection between the endangered species of sea turtles and the US 
to justify that US measures prohibiting import of shrimps, harvested in a manner which affected sea 
turtles, could qualify under Art. XX (g).77 The AB did not consider whether Art. XX (g) contains a 
limitation on jurisdiction but held that sea turtles are known for migrating to waters subject to US 
jurisdiction. Similarly in EC – Seal Products, where a ban on sale of products from seal was based 
on animal welfare; the EU claimed that hunts of seals are inhumane and that the public of the EU 
was repelled ethically and morally by such hunts.78 Without ruling on jurisdictional issues, the AB 
referred to the preamble of the contested EU Regulation which addressed seal hunting within and 
outside the EU and that seal welfare was of concern of EU citizens and consumers.79 In a footnote, 
the AB referred to the disputing parties’ agreement that there was sufficient nexus between on the 
one side the public moral and the contested measures and on the other side the EU.80 As suggested 
by Howse, there is nothing in the text of Art. XX suggesting that it cannot be applied to such 
situations.81 In addition, the above-mentioned cases indicate that the tie between the policy 
objective and the importing state follows a low standard; sea turtles may migrate to US territory and 
even though the AB did not address the issue directly in EC – Seal Products, it still referred to the 
aims of the particular EU Regulation which applied to seal products from within and outside the 
EU. Hence the AB might be able to connect the working conditions for children and the importing 
state through the importing state’s obligations under the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention. 
In addition, those situations in the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention which are prohibited 
under peremptory norms of public international law are linked to the states due to their universal 
nature and importance to the international community as a whole.82  
 
The role of vital values, which underlie peremptory norms, and their place in the WTO system still 
has to be addressed by the AB. The same goes for human rights in general. The AB has not 
provided answers to their role in relation to, for example, the exception in GATT 1994, Art. XX(a). 
In respect of non-trade values in general, the AB has developed a methodology where they are 
ranked in accordance to their ‘importance’, the AB has taken a flexible approach to the legitimate 
non-trade policy objectives, and the AB has applied a low standard for linking national measures 
with the particular object which is protected by national measures. Thus the AB has developed 
space where it can include a broad range of non-trade values under the exceptions.  
V. Protection of Non-Trade Values Outside the Exceptions 
The AB has also made space for non-trade values without reference to explicit exceptions in the 
WTO treaties. The justification is found in a market-based language by the AB. This section looks 
into two areas where the AB has made space for non-trade values without specific basis in the 
exceptions. One area is national treatment. The other area concerns the AB approach to subsidies. 
                                                 
77 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimps, above n 50, para 133. 
78 See Panel Report, EC – Seal Products, WT/DS400 and WT/DS401/R, para 7.4. 
79 Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, above n 60, para 5.173. 
80 Ibid, footnote 1191. 
81 Robert Howse, above n 76, at 143-144. 
82 See Theodore Meron, above n 36, at 1. 
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a. National Treatment and Trade Limitations 
There is a balance to be struck between on the one side a WTO Member’s right to regulate areas of 
concern, like human health, environment, criminal law, as well as right to establish rules governing 
ownership and on the other side the aim of the WTO to break down trade barriers.83 National 
treatment is a fundamental principle of WTO law and a core element in facilitating trade between 
the WTO Members. However, national treatment does not take away the WTO Members’ rights to 
legislate in areas of concern and to adopt their specific ownership regime as long as they do not 
discriminate between national and foreign products.  
 
As mentioned above, the AB dealt with questions about ‘human health’ in relation to GATT 1994, 
Art. XX(b) in EC – Asbestos. In the same case, the AB also made human health considerations in its 
‘like product’ analysis of GATT 1994, Art. III.4. The panel had found that cement-based products 
containing PCG fibres and cement-based products containing asbestos were ‘like’ products. The 
analysis by the panel had a particular focus on the end-use of the products. According to the panel 
there was no difference. Furthermore, the panel found that the products could replace each other. 
The panel rejected the argument put forward by the EC that human health considerations should be 
taken into account in the ‘like product’ analysis as it would render the exceptions in Art. XX(b) 
useless. The AB disagreed with the panel. According to the AB, the risk associated with asbestos is 
a matter of evidence. The text of Art. III.4 does not suggest that any evidence should be excluded 
from the ‘like product’ analysis. However, the health risk is not a separate criterion in the like 
product analysis. Rather, health risk is evidence which can be taken into account under the physical 
property and consumers’ taste and habits criteria in Art. III.4.84 In the particular case, the AB found 
that the health risk associated with asbestos was a physical element and relevant under the physical 
property criterion.85 Furthermore, the AB was persuaded that consumer behaviour is different 
towards a product carrying health risk compared to a product without such risks.86 Health risk 
evidence is ‘relevant in assessing the competitive relationship in the marketplace between allegedly 
"like" products’ (emphasis by the AB).87 The AB then reversed the ‘like product’ findings by the 
panel.   
 
The AB approach in EC – Asbestos has been transplanted into other WTO treaties. For example, in 
US – Clove Cigarettes, the US Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act prohibited cigarettes with 
special flavours like clove. The Act did not prohibit regular cigarettes or menthol cigarettes. The 
aim of the prohibition was to reduce youth smoking. Cigarettes with special flavours were in 
particular popular among young people in social gatherings. Indonesia, which exported clove 
cigarettes to the US, made a complaint against the US asserting that the US violated the national 
treatment obligation of Art. 2.1 of the TBT Agreement and Art. III.4 of GATT 1994. The panel had 
in its national treatment assessment based its ‘like product’ analysis of Art. 2.1 of the TBT and Art. 
III.4 of GATT 1994 between clove cigarettes and menthol cigarettes on physical characteristics, 
                                                 
83 Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, above n 61, para 109. 
84 Para. 113. 
85 Para. 114. 
86 Para. 122. 
87 Para. 115. 
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end-uses, consumer tastes and habits, and tariff classification in light of the regulatory objectives. 
The panel found that clove cigarettes and menthol cigarettes were ‘like’ each other and the panel 
found that the imported cigarettes were given a less favourable treatment than the domestic 
products. The AB upheld the panel decision although for different reasons. It referred to EC – 
Asbestos, and stated that the ‘like product’ analysis, including the regulatory concerns underlying 
the national measures like human health concerns, can be useful to the national treatment 
assessment under Art. 2.1 of the TBT Agreement if they have an impact on the competitive 
relationship between the products.88 The panel had failed by determining the likeness between the 
products in light of the regulatory objective instead of the competitive relationship between the 
products.89 Thus the regulatory concerns must be seen in light of the competitive environment. 
Human health is not in itself a sufficient reason; the only reason to protect human health must be 
found in the economic language of the competitive relationship between the products.90 
Nevertheless, the approach by the AB in EC – Asbestos and US – Clove Cigarettes indicates that 
through the economic language there is space for the WTO Members to protect non-trade values 
without resorting to explicit exceptions.  
 
The AB has in also its interpretation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) indicated that WTO Members can impose trade restrictions which may hit 
specific WTO Members without violating the national treatment obligation. In US — Section 211 
Appropriations Act,91 the EC claimed that US trademark law violated TRIPS and the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, as amended by the Stockholm Act of 1967 
(Paris Convention (1967)).92 The US applied special rules towards trademarks which had been 
confiscated by the Cuban government. Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriateion Act provided 
that such trademarks could not be registered and enforced ‘unless the original owner of the mark, 
trade name, or commercial name, or the bona fide successor-in-interest has expressly consented.’ 
The EC claimed that the consent requirement prevented existing trademark owners from enjoying 
their rights and it was an obstacle to register new trademarks and therefore violated Art. 15 of 
TRIPS which defines a trademark. The AB stated that the US legislation concerned ‘ownership’ 
which is not regulated in TRIPS or the Paris Convention (1967). In addition, Art. 15(2) provides 
that a WTO Member may reject registration of a trademark on other grounds than those relating to 
the definition of a trademark as long as they do not derogate from the Paris Convention (1967). For 
example, Art. 6quinquies of the Paris Convention (1967) contains ordre public exceptions. The EC 
claimed that none of the exceptions in the Paris Convention (1967) could apply to the consent 
requirement in the US rules. The explicit exceptions in TRIPS and the Paris Convention (1967) 
were not disputed. The question was whether there are other exceptions than those mentioned in 
TRIPS and the Paris Convention (1967). With basis in Art. 6 (1) of the Paris Convention (1967), the 
AB found that it is left to the WTO Members to determine the conditions for filing and registration. 
                                                 
88 Para. 119. 
89 Para. 136. 
90 If human health cannot be protected through the economic approach, the WTO Member must resort to the exceptions. 
91 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States — Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 (US — Section 211 
Appropriations Act), WT/DS176/AB/R, adopted 1 February 2002. 
92 It follows from Art. 2 of TRIPS that it must comply with the Paris Convention (1967).  
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Thus, a WTO Member can impose requirements like the consent requirement without violating 
TRIPS and the Paris Convention (1967).93 In addition, the WTO Members can choose their specific 
rules governing ownership. It opens up for rules, like the US rules, where confiscation of 
trademarks by another state eliminates the intellectual property rights associated with those 
trademarks.94 The AB went on and examined whether the US had violated the national treatment 
principle enshrined in Art. 3.1 of TRIPS and Art. 2(1) of the Paris Convention (1967). Here the AB 
noted that the national treatment obligation requires WTO Members to accord ‘no less favourable 
treatment to non-nationals than to nationals in the "protection" of trade-related intellectual property 
rights’.95 The AB then referred to its analysis about ownership and stated that neither TRIPS nor the 
Paris Convention (1967) requires a WTO Member to adopt a particular ownership regime.96 Thus, 
the WTO Members can establish rules about how to acquire as well as how to lose ownership over 
intellectual property. TRIPS engages to some extent with rights of the owners of intellectual 
property like the exclusive rights of the trademark owner to prevent third-parties from using the 
trademark without the consent of the trademark owner,97 but it is silent about a situation like the one 
in US – Section 211 Appropriations Act. Even though WTO law does not interfere into the national 
ownership regimes, the different political, economic and cultural ideologies underlying the 
respective ownership regimes seem to justify a rejection of trade under WTO law. In this case WTO 
law justifies a state’s rejection of enforcing the rights associated with trademarks if they have been 
confiscated from private companies by a state with a Communist rule.             
 
b. Negative Externalities and Protection of Non-Trade Values 
As mentioned above, negative externalities, like pollution, provide inefficient economic outcomes 
due to increased social costs. The private gain does not outweigh the costs of life, health or the cost 
of sustaining exhaustible resources which otherwise are damaged by pollution. Hence the market 
itself cannot provide the efficient outcome and it is necessary with governmental intervention. The 
AB has referred to negative externalities as legitimate reason to protect non-trade values. Canada – 
Renewable Energy and Canada – Feed-In Tariff Program concerned the feed-in tariff (FIT) 
programme in Canada which allegedly was a subsidy in violation of the Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement). The FIT programme guaranteed suppliers of 
electricity a fixed price by the Government if the supply of electricity was based on renewable 
energy. The SCM Agreement does not contain a list of non-trade policy objectives which can justify 
a subsidy.98  A subsidy exists ‘if there is a financial contribution by a government or any public 
                                                 
93 The US violated both the national treatment principle and most favoured nation principle in TRIPS Art. 3(1) and Art. 
4 as Cuban nationals faced more administrative steps than US nationals and other nationals. 
94 Para. 195. 
95 Para. 243. 
96 Ibid. However, in the specific case, the US had violated the national treatment obligation because they imposed extra 
procedural hurdles on Cuban nationals than US nationals. 
97 Art. 16 of TRIPS. 
98 See however the SCM Agreement, Art. 8(2)(c):‘Notwithstanding the provisions of Parts III and V, the following 
subsidies shall be non-actionable (…) assistance to promote adaptation of existing  facilities to new environmental 
requirements imposed by law and/or regulations which result in greater constraints and financial burden on firms’. Art. 
8 expired in 1999. 
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body within the territory of a Member’ (…) and ‘a benefit is thereby conferred.’99 The AB stated 
that in order to determine whether a benefit had been conferred, it should be determined whether the 
financial contribution by the government was on more favourable terms for the recipient than those 
terms provided by the market.100 Hence the relevant market had to be defined. The question was 
whether the relevant market was a general market for electricity or a narrow market for electricity 
based on renewable energy. In the case of the latter, a benefit would not be conferred if all the 
suppliers of electricity based on renewable energy could be part of the FIT programme. Canada 
held that the relevant market was the market for electricity produced from solar PV and windpower 
technology, i.e. renewable energy, whereas Japan and the EU claimed that the relevant market was 
the general market for electricity. At the panel stage, the Panel had agreed with Japan and the EU. 
According to the Panel, the consumers of electricity in Ontario did not distinguish between 
electricity on the basis of different generation technologies.101 The AB criticized the Panel’s market 
definition as the Panel had not considered the supply side and the Panel’s analysis of the demand 
side had not included several factors which may differentiate the markets, like the type of contract, 
the size of the customer, and the type of electricity generated (base-load versus peak-load). 
According to the AB, the ‘supply-side factors suggest that windpower and solar PV producers of 
electricity cannot compete with other electricity producers because of differences in cost structures 
and operating costs and characteristics.’102 Even though the final product, electricity, might be the 
same, it is necessary to distinguish between the sources of supply.103 Furthermore, the Panel had 
wrongly decided the demand side to be the consumers at the retail level. According to the AB, the 
correct buyer was the Government of Ontario, which bought electricity on the wholesale level, and 
not the consumers at the retail level. The AB stated furthermore that the existence of the windpower 
and solar PV generation would be impeded without governmental interference. According to the 
AB, the relevant market was therefore ‘the competitive markets for wind- and solar PV-generated 
electricity, which are created by the government definition of the energy supply-mix,’ not the 
general market for electricity.104 
 
Turning to the question of the benefit benchmark for electricity produced from windpower and solar 
PV technologies, the AB continued its critique of the Panel’s methodology. Even though the Panel 
initially defined the relevant market as the general electricity market, it found that ‘competitive 
wholesale electricity markets, although a theoretical possibility, will only rarely operate in a way 
that remunerates the mix of generators needed to secure a reliable electricity system with enough 
revenue to cover their all-in costs, let alone a system that pursues human health and environmental 
                                                 
99 SCM Agreement, Art. 1 (a)(1).  The term ’benefit’ of Art. 1 is clarified in Art. 14 (d). 
100 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Renewable Energy and Canada – Feed-In Tariff Program, above n 22, para. 
5.163. See also WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft (Canada – 
Aircraft), WT/DS70/AB/R, adopted 20 August 1999, para. 157 
101 Para. 7.318 in the panel report. 
102 Para. 5.174. The AB noted that’Windpower and solar PV technologies have very high capital costs (as compared to 
other generation technologies).’ Capital costs are fixed costs which the producer often just bears once. The AB further 
stated that windpower and solar PV technologies hardly have any economies of scale which means that the costs of 
producing will not decrease with an increase in production.  
103 Ibid. 
104 Para. 5.178. 
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objectives through the inclusion of facilities using solar PV and wind technologies into the supply-
mix.’105 The Panel applied the language of the non-trade policy objectives in GATT 1994, Art. XX 
and GATS, Art. XIV and stated furthermore that a competitive wholesale market might not attract 
the needed investments to secure a reliable supply of electricity. The AB found that the approach by 
the Panel had no basis in the SCM Agreement as the Panel seemed to apply factors as ‘reliable 
electricity system’ and ‘human health and environmental objectives’ as exceptions to the market 
based rule in the SCM Agreement. The AB stated that an introduction of legitimate policy 
objectives could not be reconciled with the SCM Agreement but it did not exclude governments 
from intervening to ‘create markets that would otherwise not exist.’106 According to the AB, 
without such creation of a market by the government, there would be a risk that electricity would 
not be constant and reliable. From long term considerations, fossil energy resources would be 
exhaustible whereas renewable energy can provide reliable supply of electricity in the long run.107 It 
was necessary to distinguish between a government’s intervention to create a new market, which 
logically could not be seen as a distortion on an existing market, and a government’s intervention to 
support certain businesses on an existing market which could distort that market.108 Besides the 
long term considerations, which justified the invention of a new market, the AB stated that all costs, 
inclusive of externalities, should be included in the analysis. The higher-priced electricity from 
renewable energy provides positive externalities, like guaranteed long-term supply and it addresses 
environmental concerns, whereas the lower-priced electricity based on ‘lower prices for non-
renewable electricity generation have certain negative externalities, such as the adverse impact on 
human health and the environment of fossil fuel energy emissions and nuclear waste disposal’109 
(my emphasis). Hence the negative impact on non-trade values like human health and the 
environment caused by an existing market may justify that a government creates a ‘new’ market to 
internalize the negative externalities.  
 
The case is interesting as the AB rejects human health and environment as legitimate reasons for 
departing from the SMC Agreement. That textual approach is not novel; as mentioned above, the 
AB does not read additional policy objectives into GATT 1994, Art. XX than those explicitly 
mentioned. Even though human health and the environment cannot be seen as legitimate exceptions 
in this case, it does not render them unprotected. The economic argumentation developed by the AB 
about externalities saved the day for the human health and environmental objectives. In line with 
the national treatment assessments, the AB has also in respect of subsidies found space to include 
non-trade values through its economic argumentation. 
VI. Final Thoughts 
Human health has so far been protected in WTO law through the explicit policy objectives of the 
WTO treaties; in the ‘like product’ analysis; and as a value necessary to protect against market 
                                                 
105 Para. 7.309 in the panel report. 
106 Para. 5.185. 
107 Para. 5.186. 
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109 Para. 5.189. 
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failures. Even though the AB adopts different roads of argumentations, it can be asked whether 
human health has attained a high-ranking status which will be protected across the WTO system by 
the AB. After all, the AB has regarded human health as a vital value. The same question may be 
asked about environmental protection, which so far has been protected in the explicit exceptions of 
the WTO treaties and as a value necessary to protect against market failures. There is no reason to 
expect that environmental concerns cannot play a part in the ‘like product’ considerations as well. 
According to the AB, the environment is an important value.  
 
The method behind the ranking of values is so far left behind a curtain but it opens up for a 
question; has the AB put itself in a position where certain values cannot be ignored in the WTO 
system? Even though the ranking of non-trade values is part of the necessity test, and that the AB 
will not read other values into the WTO system than those which can fit into one of the explicit 
policy objectives, the consideration of the importance of the non-trade values will make it difficult 
for the AB to reject such vital values as enshrined in the Worst Forms of Child Labour 
Convention,110 in particular those which have status as peremptory norms of general international 
law like prohibition of slavery.111  The AB could find justification under the public morality 
protection in WTO law, the preamble of the WTO Agreement, and the 1996 Singapore Ministerial 
Conference Declaration, where the Ministerial Conference renewed its commitment to the 
observance of internationally recognized core labour standards,112 and thereby avoid the question 
of the hierarchic nature of peremptory norms and their role in WTO law.113 But how would the AB 
respond to a situation where such vital values do not have explicit protection as a legitimate policy 
objective under any of the WTO treaties like the case with the SCM Agreement? Would the AB be 
able to apply the economic language to justify governmental interference into the market – like the 
creation of a new market – if the particular governmental support aimed at businesses which could 
demonstrate that they carried out control of their suppliers’ conformity with the principles reflected 
in the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention? The answer must be negative. The AB would 
have to search for other routes than the market-based in order to avoid the indirect acknowledgment 
of a market for products produced by child slaves.114 Perhaps the AB would have to take the step in 
direction of peremptory norms and admitting them into its methodology and thereby opening the 
door to higher-ranking non-trade values in the WTO.       
                                                 
110 This writer implicitly acknowledges the absolute and fundamental character of the peremptory norms prohibiting 
slavery as stipulated in the convention.   
111 See the ICJ about prohibition of slavery as erga omnes obligations in Barcelona Traction, Light and Power 
Company, Limited, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 3, para. 32, and the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) Community Court of Justice; Koraou v Niger, AHRLR 182 (ECOWAS 2008), paras. 75 and 81. See 
Theodore Meron, above n 36, at 11. 
112 Singapore WTO Ministerial 1996: Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN (96)/DEC, 18 December 1996.  
113 Please keep in mind the discussion above about the potential conflict between the trade rules and peremptory norms 
if the AB seeks justification for the trade restrictions under the exceptions. 
114 Such a market would be the comparative basis for the market with products not produced by child slaves. 
